We develop and estimate an econometric model of the relationship between several local and global air and water pollutants and economic development while allowing for critical aspects of the socio-politicaleconomic regime of a State. We obtain empirical support for our hypothesis that democracy and its associated freedoms provide the conduit through which agents can exercise their preferences for environmental quality more effectively than under an autocratic regime, thus leading to decreased concentrations or emissions of pollution. However, additional factors such as income inequality, age distribution, and urbanization may mitigate or exacerbate the net effect of the type of political regime on pollution, depending on the underlying societal preferences and the weights assigned to those preferences by the State. JEL Classification: O13, Q28, H40, D78
Introduction
The examination of the relationship between national income and environmental quality has become of great interest to economists, policy-makers, and the public at large. This interest is not only expressed within national boundaries but also is reflected by growing conflicts between global environmental concerns and global economic development policy, as seen by uprisings at recent WTO meetings. Previous literature has focused on the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which hypothesizes an inverted-U shape when pollution indicators are plotted against income per capita.
Explanations for this hypothesis generally focus on several primary factors that interact to produce the shape. Among these are (1) changes in the composition of aggregate output as economies evolve from agricultural to industrial to service-based goods and services,
(2) technological progress, and (3) increases in demand for environmental quality as income grows (Anderson and Cavendish, 2001; Ansuategi and Escapa, 2002; Grossman and Kruger, 1995; Heerink, et. al., 2001; Panatoyou, 1997) .
However, as most authors tend to agree, the relationship between environmental quality and economic development is not formed in isolation from political institutions that govern the process of policy making in a particular country. Thus, for example, Dasgupta and Mäler (1995, P. 2412) have aptly emphasized: "The connection between environmental protection and civil and political rights is a close one. As a general rule, political and civil liberties are instrumentally powerful in protecting the environmental resource-base, at least when compared with the absence of such liberties in countries run by authoritarian regimes". This observation raises several important questions: How does pubic policy towards environmental quality influence the relationship between per capita income and pollution, and how does that public policy represent the citizens' preferences for environmental quality? In other words, can we identify demand-side characteristics that influence the State's environmental policy regime, and can we explain the mechanism(s) through which these preferences are manifested?
Several authors have included explanatory variables to explicitly account for the role of political institutions in the income-environment relationship. For example, in their study of the causes of deforestation in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) use a measurement of institutional quality, measured by an index of political rights and civil liberties, to account for the role of different policy regimes. Torras and Boyce (1998) However, these studies did not explicitly decompose the demand for environmental policy based on heterogeneous population characteristics, nor did they address the potential for distortions of the environmental quality preferences by the political regime. This paper proposes an empirical econometric model of the relation between several local and global air and water pollutants and economic development, measured by national income per capita. The model explicitly accounts for critical aspects of the sociopolitical-economic regime of a State. Specifically, we develop a model that directly incorporates the relationship between societal preferences and provision of public pollution abatement, utilizing a measure of quality of governance as a proxy for weights on those preferences. We hypothesize that democracy and its associated freedoms 2 provide the conduit through which agents can exercise their preferences for environmental goods more effectively than under an autocratic regime, thus resulting in reduced concentrations and/or emissions of pollution. However, additional variables such as income inequality, age distribution, and urbanization may mitigate or exacerbate the net effect of the type of governance on pollution, depending on the underlying preferences of the population at large and the weights assigned to those preferences by the State.
Section 2 provides a simple representation of the relationship between demandside preferences of the population and realized environmental policy. Section 3 describes the structure and key variables included in the empirical models. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis and the estimation issues that arise. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
Relationship between Environmental Policy, Governance, and Preferences
One of the major determinants of environmental policy is the socio-political regime of a particular country, or "governance" as phrased by Rivera-Batiz (2002) .
Specifically, Lopez and Mitra (2000) argue that corruption and rent-seeking behavior can influence the relationship between income and the environment. In general, they provide a theoretical model that shows corruption causes the turning points of an EKC to rise above the social optimum. They suggest that corruption manifests itself as rent-seeking behavior by the State. Additionally, Magnani (2000) suggests that well-defined property rights, democratic voting systems, and respect of human rights can create synergies that lead to increased levels and efficacy of environmental policy.
We propose a simple explanation of this argument, based on the relationship between the demand and supply of environmental quality. Because environmental quality is, in most cases, a public good, and in many cases the capital costs of the required infrastructures to abate pollution are huge, individuals or groups within a society are unable to effectively provide them. 1 As such, provision of these goods usually comes from the State, and the realized environmental policy is a function of the preferences of society. The correlation between preferred and actual levels of environmental quality will depend on the weights placed on the various heterogeneous societal preferences by the policy makers, which can be generally characterized as the policy regime.
To illustrate, consider the following simple model. Assume that the N individuals in society can be aggregated into two non-intersecting groups, i = 1,2. Each group is represented by a certain representative consumer with a different intensity of preferences for environmental quality. The preferences are assumed to be reflected by each representative consumer's propensity for abatement efforts to be undertaken by the State, and are denoted by , where γ i is a measure of the distinguishing characteristic of the ith group. The categorical distinctions can be made along any number of characteristics that are likely to affect environmental preferences, such as "rich vs. poor", "educated vs. non-educated", or "young vs. old". In the case of the former, γ i may represent total income of the ith group, while in the latter cases, it represents the number of individuals in each category. Suppose further that for any γ i > 0, the first group's preference for environmental quality and hence abatement efforts is more 
That is, the actual public abatement level is a weighted average of the preferred abatement levels by each category and the State. Notice that in a purely egalitarian Expressing equation (2) 
the sign of which is determined both by preferences intensities and the weights given to each preference group by the State.
For example, assume that γ represents education level and a particular society has an equal number of "educated" and "non-educated" citizens (i.e. α α = = , and equation (5) predicts that increased education levels ( E γ γ ) will increase the aggregate propensity to spend on abatement efforts, and hence lead to higher environmental quality. If, however, there were a greater percentage of those in the "non-educated" category ( 1 2 N E γ γ > > ), or due to distortions in the political system (such as a "pro" non-educated bias of the government), the government placed a much larger weight on the preferences of those without education ( 2 1 2 1 α α > > ), then it is possible that the government's abatement efforts (and hence environmental quality) would decrease as the education level of the populace increases (in this case, (5)).
While highly stylized, this model of environmental quality provision highlights the importance of the political regime on the relationship between economic development and environmental quality. Specifically, it suggests that environmental quality expenditures are, in part, a function of the preferences of society, but these preferences are subject to distortion (for example, under political pressure from interest groups), interpretation, and neglect by the State. The more open and democratic the society, however, the more likely it is that the preferences of society will be reflected in actual policy decisions.
Preference Shifters and the Empirical Models
Despite the potential complications from the assumption of unidirectional causality between economic growth and the environment, the econometric models use a reduced-form parametric approach that implies no feedback from environment to economy, with the structure allowing for flexibility via higher-order terms in GNP per capita and population density (Grossman and Kruger, 1995; Coondoo and Dinda, 2002) .
As such, the coefficient estimates represent the net effect of each shifter on pollution concentrations, but should not be interpreted as a causal relationship (Grossman and Kruger, 1995) .
Following Panayotou (1997) , we begin the decomposition by assuming that policy can be instrumented solely by the democratic/autocratic structure of political institutions of the country, resulting in the following model:
where X it denotes the pollutant measure in country i at year t, Y it is GDP per capita in year t for the country in which i is located, P it is population density in year t for country i, D it is the democracy measure in year t for country i, t is a linear time trend to account for technological change over time, β j and δ are regression coefficients, i α 's are country-level fixed effects and ε it is an error term. Note that the policy variable enters both additively and multiplicatively, allowing for both intercept and slope shifts of the estimated relationship between national income and the pollution indicator. Equation (6) is utilized as a benchmark in the analysis, and is used to test the EKC hypothesis and the effect of political institutions on environmental quality.
Equation (6) is then expanded to include variables expected to be correlated with the heterogeneous preferences of society at large, thus explicitly incorporating the demand for environmental quality into the specification. It is assumed that these preferences can be exercised only through the political system of the state, and as such the democracy variable is used to interact with each shifter. This specification implies that strongly autocratic regimes will be unresponsive to societal preferences relative to more democratic societies, with the actual weights ( α ) implied by the magnitude of the coefficients.
One preference shifter discussed in the literature is inequality, both in political power and economic power. The former is addressed through the interactions with the democracy variable. There is little agreement as to the causal relationship through which the latter, as represented by income inequality, is manifested. One hypothesis suggests that there is evidence of a positive correlation between preferences for environmental degradation and individual's income and/or power due to ownership and consumption patterns (Torras and Boyce, 1998) . This hypothesis is further advocated empirically by Bimonte (2002) with respect to public lands, and by Magnani (2000) who finds that reduced income equality decreases public expenditure on pollution abatement. It is, however, disputed by Scruggs (1998) , who argues that higher levels of education and 9 wealth are often associated with "pro environment" preferences, so that movements in these directions (implying greater income inequality) within a country may result in better environmental quality. Heerink, et. al. (2001) The education level of the population is addressed in Bimonte (2002) , who argues that increases in education are often accompanied by increases in preferences that favor a higher level of environmental amenities. At the same time, the education level may affect the governance of a nation as well, since a more educated workforce contributes to a more educated (and possibly democratic-minded) public sector (Rivera-Batiz, 2002) . The net result of this preference shifter is thus expected to be reduced pollution with greater education levels, as the two effects complement each other in sign.
Finally, urbanization is included to account for preference differences between rural and urban populations, as well as the potential economies of scale effects with regards to pollution abatement (Torras and Boyce, 1998) . Increased urbanization may also improve the quality of governance, as costs of transportation and other communication means are lowered with increased urbanization, thereby increasing the weights of citizen groups' preferences in the State's decision (Rivera-Batiz, 2002) . Of course, high degrees of urbanization may result in increased pollution concentrations as well, as fossil fuel consumption per capita and per unit area increase (Panayotou, 1997) .
Formally decomposing equation (6) to account for these preference shifters results in the following model: 
where U it is a measure of urbanization, G it is the GINI coefficient measuring inequality,
A it is the proportion of the population 14 years of age and under, I it is the illiteracy rate of the adult population as a proxy for the education level, and all other variables are as previously defined. We maintain the assumption that the regime and preference shifters can affect both the intercept and slope of the income-environment quality curve, resulting in a significantly flexible functional form with marginal effects that may depend on the current state of development.
Data and Estimation Issues
We estimate the regression models for a number of diverse environmental quality indicators for air and water quality, using data from several sources. Anthropogenic CO 2 is a greenhouse gas emitted from the burning of fossil fuels and cement production, and emissions data is collected by the United Nations for over two hundred countries for the period 1980 period -1998 period (UN, 2003 World Bank, 2003 , EPA, 2003 . The World Bank world development indicators (WDI) report biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) for over one hundred countries over the period 1980-1999. BOD is a measure of the amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in breaking down wastes, and is a measure of the lack of organic water pollution (World Bank, 2003; EPA, 2003) . Table 1 .
Issues with regard to specification, estimation, and generalizations abound, as evidenced by the special issue of Ecological Economics (1998) dedicated to the EKC.
Empirically, Stern and Common (2001) argue that evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis may be sample-specific and dependent on estimation methods, some of which may lead to omitted variable bias in the parameter estimates. Significant differences have also been found between cross-section studies and those that focus on individual countries (Roca, et. al., 2001; Vincent, 1997 ).
In addition, there are several methodological issues that must be addressed in the estimation procedure, including regressor endogeneity due to parameter heterogeneity, measurement error as result of missing observations, and multicollinearity amongst regressors. Given that we are lucky enough to have a panel data set, the endogeneity and omitted variable problem is handled through estimation of a fixed-effects (or within) model, in which the models described by equations (6) and (7) are estimated via ordinary least squares on deviations from the mean data values for dependent and independent variables (Greene, 2000) . The parameter estimates are thus calculated from variance within groups, rather than between groups, and assumes that group-specific intercept terms are fixed parameters to be estimated. Finally, multicollinearity is a problem resulting from the introduction of the power terms in the parametric regression and the interaction terms between the income variables and other shifters, leading to inflated standard errors on the highly collinear terms. Unfortunately, there is little in the way of a correction that can be performed, as the flexibility of the functional form is essential to the analysis of the EKC, and is, in fact, the goal of the exercise. Nevertheless, the reader should be cautious in interpreting the econometric results.
Results
We begin by examining the results of equation (6), as reported in Table 2 and Table 4 . As in Panayotou (1997) , this specification assumes that environmental policy Testing the effects of the policy proxy on the estimated relationship corroborates this hypothesis. In all cases, the marginal effect of the polity variable with respect to the pollutant is negative for the majority of the income range under consideration, suggesting that more democratic institutions have a greater tendency to reduce pollution. For those measures for which the effect changes sign (BOD, VOC, and SO 2 emissions), it does so at relatively low levels of income (less than the 40 th percentile of the sample data). It is interesting to note that the level of income corresponding to initial marginal benefits of improved political institutions is lower for the pollutants that more immediately and perhaps more drastically harm the general population than for those with indirect, or latent adverse affects. Thus, the benefits of improved institutions tend to occur at lower levels for water pollution (BOD) than for emissions related to fixed-source industrial pollution (SO 2 ). It appears that for most policy regimes, the State recognizes the trade-off between industrial development and environmental quality, and for any given level of income is less concerned about abating air pollution from fossil fuel use than water pollution, which more immediately affects the population.
With the recognition that environmental policy considerations are of paramount importance in describing the relationship between economic development and the environment, we turn now to the results of the model described by equation (7). This model decomposes the environmental policy indicator variable in order to account for both the heterogeneous preferences of the society and the mechanism through which these preferences are translated into realized pollution abatement. As with the previous model, the unrestricted full specification was estimated first, with subsequent restrictions imposed given the results of individual and joint significance tests. Results of the restricted model are reported in Table 3 , while qualitative characterizations of the effects of the preference and governance variables are reported in Table 5 .
Overall, the proportion of the variance in each dependent variable explained by the decomposition model increases with the expanded specification, and each preference shifter is statistically significant in at least four of the six regressions. As expected, the relationship between GDP per capita and the pollution measures is similar to that estimated in the basic model, although the CO 2 model now includes second and third degree polynomial terms, while the SO 2 emissions model excludes them. Nevertheless, the similarity in conditional results suggests that the decomposition is valid, and that demand considerations based on heterogeneous societal preferences are an important determinant of overall environmental quality.
The last row of Table 5 shows that marginal impacts of increased democracy on five of the six indicators are negative when evaluated at the sample means, as in the basic model. This again confirms that increased institutional quality tends to increase environmental quality. The exception is the estimated positive effect of increased democracy on water pollution when evaluated at the mean of the sample. Examination of the BOD coefficients in Table 3 suggests that this relationship is reversed for relatively literate or relatively young societies. In conjunction with the a priori expectations regarding the environmental preferences of these groups, this result supports the hypothesis that the institutional structure is the conduit through which environmental preferences are exercised. From a policy standpoint, strengthening the quality of institutions through democratization appears to be positively correlated with environmental quality, while degrading such institutions erodes the responsiveness to societal preferences, resulting in greater levels of pollution.
We now turn to the effects of the individual preference shifters on the pollution indicators, conditional on the state of the institutions in a given society. As seen in Table   3 (and repeated in Table 5 ), urbanization has an unambiguous net positive effect on BOD, and this relationship is unaffected by levels of polity or GDP per capita. On the other hand, urbanization is positively correlated with both the emissions and ambient concentrations of the air pollution measures, suggesting that the effects of increased fossil fuel use in urban societies dominates any economies of scale or preference effects.
However, preference effects are evident through the significant negative interaction terms in Table 3 , as the positive effects of urbanization on ambient concentrations of SO 2 and emissions of NO X are mitigated through increased democracy (and in the case of NO X , income). However, the positive marginal effects of urbanization are exacerbated by increases in polity and/or income for SO 2 , VOC, and CO 2 emissions, as seen in the first row of Table 5 . While the reasons behind these findings are plausible in the light of the theoretical model above, they are not intuitively obvious. It may be that individuals in urban areas are more sensitive to ambient concentrations than emissions, or that urban societies are more tolerant of some types of air pollution than are rural societies. Indeed, the nature of the urbanization variable makes it extremely difficult to disaggregate the potential effects, and the reduced-form equation worsens the situation, as we are only able to identify net effects of the shifter.
Another abatement demand shifter widely discussed (and disputed) in the literature is income inequality, as it is hypothesized that the distribution of income may play a role in the income/environment relationship. In this application, the proxy for income inequality, the GINI coefficient, is found to be statistically significant in four of the six regressions, as indicated in Tables 3 and 5. In the case of ambient SO 2 concentrations, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between income inequality and polity is positive, implying that increased inequality increases pollution levels, and the effect is stronger the more democratic the societal institutions. In terms of 20 the theoretical model presented by equation (5) On the other hand, Table 5 shows that emissions of CO 2 exhibit the opposite relationship, as increased inequality for levels of income slightly greater than $5,000 PPP is associated with decreased CO 2 emissions. Interestingly, a distinction can be made here between greenhouse gasses (such as CO 2 ) and the ozone and acid rain generating chemicals (such as SO 2 , VOC, and NO x ). The latter pollutants most often exhibit an EKC relationship due to the nature of the damage (primarily local), as opposed to carbon compounds which are global in nature (Stern and Common, 2001; Shafik, 1994; Ansuategi and Escapa, 2001) . One explanation for this intriguing result, then, may be that governments weight particular interest groups differently depending on the particular effects of the pollutant and the length of run under consideration. In this case, the State places a higher weight on those with high propensities to prefer environmental quality (the rich), perhaps due to lobbying activities or the lack of interest in the issue shown by the poorer members of society.
A similar pattern manifests itself in terms of the age distribution of the society, as measured by the percentage of the population less than fifteen years of age. A priori, it is expected that "younger" societies would prefer a cleaner environment and be willing to invest in pollution abatement for longer-run improved quality than would those societies that would be considered "older". As seen on the "Youth" row of Table 5 , this expectation is confirmed for the NO x and VOC emissions regressions, in that the percentage of children as a proxy for age distribution is negatively correlated with emissions for these chemicals. The relationship is reversed only for SO 2 emissions with very high GDP per capita at levels (achieved by only 5% of the observations in the sample). A similar result holds for water pollution, and the relationship for three out of these four pollutants is exacerbated by increases in the democracy measure. Again, however, CO 2 emissions are predicted to increase with the category presumed to have a relative preference towards environmental quality, and this marginal effect is intensified with increases in GDP per capita. It thus appears that the nature of the pollutant may affect the weights, and thus the rate, at which preferred environmental policy is translated to realized environmental policy.
The last preference shifter under consideration is the education of the populace, as proxied by the illiteracy rate for adults greater than fourteen years of age. As seen in Table 3 , at least one education term is significant in all of the emissions regressions, though no significant correlation could be determined for ambient SO 2 . However, the sign of the marginal effects of illiteracy on environmental quality, as qualitatively reported in Table 5 , may require additional explanation. First, note that for income per capita levels generally less than the mean of the sample, illiteracy enters the model with the expected sign (a negative correlation between illiteracy and environmental policy).
While in four cases the marginal effect changes sign at relatively higher income levels, this result has little economic meaning. Specifically, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of high per capita income and high illiteracy rates, nor there exist data points in the sample consistent with this pattern. We conclude that in the relevant range of per capita income levels, more education, as proxied by a decline in the illiteracy rate, results in a greater demand for environmental quality, but does so at a decreasing rate.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the link between income per capita and environmental quality. Recognizing that the often-cited "inverted U-shaped" relationship or EKC is not an inevitable result of growth in income, a structural model was developed that specifically accounted for different environmental policy regimes. The regime was identified as a function of governance and preference variables, with preferences for environmental policy exercised through interactions with the political system. 
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